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ABSTRACT
In the late 1960s, William Baumol demonstrated that structurally unbalanced growth, with the 
associated cost disease phenomenon, can be expected to have some very particular effects on 
work and labor in slow-progressive sectors of the economy: performing arts, health care, education, 
and law enforcement. Specifically, there will be downward pressure on the rate of growth of unit 
wages and upward pressure on the rate of growth of productivity in these sectors. In the long run, 
the effects of cost disease are potentially damaging for work and labor in some of the key human 
service occupations in the public sector.
In this interdisciplinary paper, we put forward a simple model, which reconstructs and renews 
the model discovered by Baumol in 1967. Our model makes only a minor modification to 
Baumol’s original cost disease model, but the implications of this modification are noteworthy. 
They are also largely unexplored in empirical research. In this paper, we search for empirical 
traces of the effects of cost disease on work and labor. We use earlier economic and social 
scientific research literature on inter-industry wage differences and on time pressure, and we 
analyze differences in work orientations with the help of the ISSP Work Orientations III data 
set. Our empirical findings are early and rough intimations. However, they do give preliminary 
support to the propositions of the paper. The observed changes in employment, wages, and 
experienced time pressure all correspond to what we would expect on the basis of the cost 
disease hypothesis. The same applies to the observed differences in the structure of incentives 
across different occupational groups. The paper is not empirically conclusive, but we see it as a 
basis for interesting further research.
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Introduction
Baumol and Bowen (1965/1997, 1966) pointed out in their classic inquiries into the economic difficulties characteristic of performing arts1 that the conditions of work in the performing arts differ from the conditions of work in other economic 
activities. For a majority of performing artists, though certainly not for all,2 leading a 
life of a performing artist meant constant struggle for earning a living. However hard 
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they tried, and however low they kept the costs of their own company, it appeared 
that they were fighting a losing battle. In terms of the current paper, they were un-
der the twin pressures characteristic of the slow-progressive sectors of the economy: 
downward pressure on the rate of growth of wages and upward pressure on the rate 
of growth of productivity.
Baumol and Bowen (1965/1997, 1966) were equally careful in pointing out that this 
had some very specific effects on labor in the slow-progressive sectors of the economy, 
i.e., on the workers who opted for a career in the performing arts and decided to stay 
in the field. They enjoyed music, for instance, and got deep psychic income from their 
chosen art. In terms of modern theories of motivation, they appreciated the intrinsic 
motivational aspects of their occupation, rather than the extrinsic incentives involved 
with it (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Ryan and Deci, 2000).
There are two parts to this paper. In the first part, we present a simple model 
which reconstructs and renews the argument by Baumol and Bowen. The theoretical 
discussion in this paper focuses on the effects of cost disease on unit wages, produc-
tivity pressure, and the structure of incentives in slow-progressive economic activi-
ties. Earlier research has focused on other kinds of implications of the cost disease 
phenomenon. The emphasis has been on the contraction of the overall rate of growth 
of the economy in the long run, the problems concerned with the overall tax rate of 
the economy, and the associated problems of sustainable social spending. In view of 
different industries, earlier analyses cover at least performing arts, health care, educa-
tion, mass media, computing technology (hardware, software), and law enforcement 
and military (see Baumol, 1967, 1993a, 1993b, 1996, 2012; Baumol and Baumol, 
1984/1997; Baumol and Bowen, 1965/1997, 1966; Baumol and Oates, 1972/1997; 
Baumol et al., 1985; Besharov, 2005; Cowen, 1996; Fordham, 2003; Lindbeck, 
2006; Nordhaus, 2002, 2006; Oulton, 2001; Peacock, 1996; Preston and Sparviero, 
2009; Scitovsky and Scitovsky, 1959; Sparviero and Preston, 2010; Triplett and 
Bosworth, 2003; van der Ploeg, 2006; van Reenen, 1999).
In the second part of the paper, we take a brief, early look at the empirical evi-
dence. We analyze the effects of cost disease on the nature of work and working condi-
tions in the slow-progressive economic activities. First, we briefly revisit the literature on 
inter-industry wage differentials. Then, in a bit more detailed analysis, we consider the 
predicted effects of cost disease on productivity pressure and on intrinsic vs. extrinsic 
incentives. We ask and aspire to answer the following:
What happens to employees’ experience of time pressure in an economy which 1. 
experiences a massive shift of employment from agriculture and manufacturing in-
dustries to labor-intensive services, with opportunities for labor-augmenting techno-
logical improvements tapering off?
If time pressure, as a manifestation of productivity pressure, shoots up as ex-2. 
pected, and if wages in the slow-progressive sectors are lagging behind other sec-
tors, why is it that the supply of labor does not collapse in the slow-progressive 
sectors?
Does the actual, observed structure of incentives correspond to the expected struc-3. 
ture of incentives, in the sense that intrinsic incentives are accentuated in the oc-
cupations of the slow-progressive sectors, compared with the occupations of the 
fast-progressive sectors?
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Cost disease
Growth of productivity is one of the stylized facts of economic growth. However, the 
rate of growth of productivity is different in different economic activities. It is relatively 
low in labor-intensive services with limited opportunities to labor-augmenting techno-
logical change, and it is relatively high in capital-intensive manufacturing industries 
with rich opportunities for such improvements (Clark, 1957; Kuznets, 1973; Maddison, 
1982, 1991).
In terms of Baumol (1967), the former are the “non-progressive” sectors of the 
economy, whereas the latter are the “progressive” sectors. The non-progressive sectors of 
the economy can be expected to be plagued by the so-called cost disease. In these sectors, 
the real unit costs grow on a continuous basis.
Baumol’s (1967) Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban 
Crisis formalized the idea with the help of a relatively simple macroeconomic model. 
Baumol stated, as his opening words to the article, that “There are some economic forces 
so powerful that they constantly break through all barriers erected for their suppres-
sion.” He proposed to deal with a mechanism, which, he thought, “(…) has colored the 
past and seems likely to stamp its character on the future” (Baumol 1967, p. 415).
According to Baumol (1967), growth is systematically unbalanced because the rates 
of growth of productivity are different in different sectors of the economy. The system-
atic nature of the differences relates to the function of labor in the process of production. 
It relates to whether or not labor is “(…) itself the end product,” and not merely “(…) an 
incidental requisite for the attainment of the final product (…)” (Baumol, 1967, p. 416). 
The former kinds of activities constitute the non-progressive sector of the economy, 
while the latter kinds of activities form the progressive sector. Baumol actually assumed 
that, in the non-progressive sector, there would be no productivity growth at all. Ir-
respective of this, he also assumed that the rates of growth of wages in the two sectors 
would be the same. Baumol’s results were highly dependent on these two assumptions, 
but they are not as restrictive as they may appear at first sight. We will actually relax the 
wage rate assumption here in this paper.
Based on the results of his model, Baumol (1967) suggested that
The cost per unit of output of the non-progressive sector will rise without limit.1. 
All except the highly price inelastic (and/or highly income elastic) outputs of the 2. 
non-progressive sector will decline, and some of them will disappear altogether.
Nevertheless, if and in so far as the ratio of the outputs between the progressive and 3. 
the non-progressive sectors will be held constant, the non-progressive sector will 
suck and employ an ever larger share of the total labor force of the economy.
If the non-progressive sector displays a zero rate of growth of productivity and if, at 4. 
the same time, the total labor force remains constant, the overall rate of growth of 
the economy will asymptotically approach zero (Baumol, 1967, pp. 418–419).
According to Baumol (1967), only the municipalities—the local government sector—are 
capable of supporting some of the most important non-progressive political economic ac-
tivities. These include, among other services, health care, education, and law enforcement.
Macroeconomics of unbalanced growth thus called forth the anatomy of urban cri-
sis. Slower-than-average growth of productivity and faster-than-average growth of unit 
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costs would chronically strain municipalities. An ever-greater share of the labor force 
would be drawn into the public sector, particularly to public services. Gradually, but 
inevitably, the overall economic growth of political economies would first slow down 
and then die out. The developments will attract offsetting institutional changes, but, 
according to Baumol (1967, p. 423), the trend in the real costs of municipal services 
cannot be stopped.
But note that it is not impossible to keep to the non-progressive core public services. 
In fact, the rising real costs of non-progressive economic activities constitute no problem 
at all, provided the citizens are prepared to reallocate their spending correspondingly. 
They can afford these services. This is written into the model assumptions: the produc-
tivity of the economy is improving. This, of course, does not do away with the fact that 
the process of reallocation will have to be incessant; it will have to be a permanent part 
of the way the political economy functions (Baumol, 1992/1997, 1993a, 1993b, 1996; 
Baumol and Baumol, 1985/1997).
The propositions of the current paper prevail on the condition that reallocation—
growing public support for the non-progressive core public services—combines with 
other measures, fiscal and monetary discipline in the public sector, and varied, persis-
tent efforts to improve productivity in public services. There is realism, we presume, 
to our conditional propositions. According to the early appraisal by Tibor and Anne 
Scitovsky (1959), “Whatever the reason, these services have become dearer compared 
to other goods; and this fact, combined with the public’s reluctance to spend more on 
them, has occasionally led to the reduction in their supply or worsening of their quality” 
(Scitovsky and Scitovsky, 1959, p. 102; see also Baumol, 1993a, pp. 23–27).
Tax rate and differential wage rates in a model of unbalanced growth
In the original model by Baumol (1967), the rates of growth of wages in the two 
sectors were the same. This was unrealistic, perhaps, but it would have been equally 
unrealistic to assume that the rate of growth of wages in the slow-progressive sector 
was zero.
There is a third alternative, which actually corresponds to the early intimation by 
Baumol and Bowen (1966) as probably the most realistic assumption as regards the 
development of wages in the slow-progressive sector. Having considered the two other 
alternatives, Baumol and Bowen went on to write: “There is a third alternative, which, 
in fact, comes closest to what we find in practice. Wages of performers do rise, but they 
do not always manage to keep up with wages in the rest of the economy. (…) Even 
in the long run, earnings in the performing arts may lag behind wages in occupations 
which provide less in the way of psychic income” (Baumol and Bowen 1966, p. 169; cf. 
Nordhaus, 2006, p. 28, footnote 22; cf. also Baumol and Throsby, 2012).
In Appendix B of this paper, we take a more formal look at the argument. Baumol’s 
(1967) model will be updated with both tax rate of the economy (following Lindbeck’s 
(2006) model) and differentially growing wage rates for the two sectors. Formalizing 
the idea reveals an interesting domain of parameters, with high taxes and two coexistent 
pressures. 
Essentially, the model in Appendix B demonstrates that there is an analytically fea-
sible and empirically plausible domain of parameters in which
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the tax rate of the economy reaches its all-time high, when, at the same time,1. 
employees in the slow-progressive sector suffer from lower-than-average wages and 2. 
when, still in the same domain of parameters,
the organizations and employees in the sector have to deal with persistent and often 3. 
stern productivity pressure.
Readers interested in formal analysis will probably benefit from the model depicted in 
Appendix B, but for all practical purposes, the three hypotheses (1–3) derived from the 
model suffice to do the trick.
Empirically, there are probably many intervening factors making it difficult to sort 
out the exact effects on the affected, slow-progressive economic activities,3 but, analyti-
cally, the following question seems to be not only legitimate but also very interesting. 
Are work and labor in the “laggard services, (…) health care, education, legal services, 
welfare programs for the poor, postal service, police protection, sanitation, repair ser-
vices, the performing arts and restaurants” (Baumol 1992/1997, p. 507) really featured 
by the characteristics, predicted by the cost disease model (see Appendix B)?
The cost disease model—some second thoughts
The empirical evidence by and large agrees with what the cost disease model predicts,4 
but there are also scholars who have not been convinced by the cost disease argument.5 
Given the extent of the existing literature on the cost disease hypothesis (see, for exam-
ple, the special issue on the hypothesis in the Journal of Cultural Economics, Volume 20, 
Issue 3, 1996; the anthology by Towse (ed.), 1997; the scholarly history on the subject 
by Besharov, 2005; and the most recent review of the intellectual field by Baumol, 2012), 
we cannot tackle all objections to the cost disease model here in this paper. We settle for 
taking a look at two critical discussions concerning the hypothesis.
1) The first type of critique of the cost disease model has to do with the impact of 
technological innovations on the supposedly non-progressive services. There are several 
distinct human services that seem to have been capable of escaping the cost disease trap. 
The development of technology, especially under the auspices of modern information 
and communication technologies (ICTs), has profound and often unforeseeable effects 
on the structure of the economy. Significant productivity improvements have suddenly 
become possible in many distinct sectors of the performing arts (recording devices, the 
Internet, and new mobile technologies and applications), health care (medication, new 
techniques in, e.g., surgery), teaching (distance education), and law enforcement (auto-
matic surveillance).
In analyzing the “new economy” (ICT), Nordhaus (2002) and Triplett and Bos-
worth (2003) decomposed the productivity growth statistics of the U.S. economy. What 
they found was an unexpected, robust upturn in the productivity statistics around the 
mid-1990s. The upturn was economy-wide in the sense that it was not restricted to 
the new economy (industrial and electronic machinery (semiconductors)). Productivity 
in the retail and the wholesale trade in particular had also improved. This was unex-
pected, especially after the marked productivity slowdown from the mid-1970s to the 
mid-1990s. Nordhaus and Triplett and Bosworth interpreted this as meaning that “Bau-
mol’s Disease Has Been Cured” (Triplett and Bosworth, 2003; see also Nordhaus, 2002, 
100 Work and Labor in Slow-Progressive Sectors of the Economy Matti  Vuorensyrjä
p. 228, and passim; Preston and Sparviero, 2009; Sparviero and Preston, 2010; cf. also 
Nordhaus, 2006).
Critics of the cost disease hypothesis were not surprised by these findings. According 
to Tyler Cowen (1996, p. 208), in cultural economic activities, the continuous stream of 
new recording technologies (long-playing records, compact discs, the radio, and jukebox) 
clashes with the cost disease argument. Cowen emphasizes, along with his core argu-
ment, that the cost disease model neglects quality improvements on the output side and 
that it thus fails to properly account for productivity improvements in cultural economic 
activities. Also, according to Cowen, empirical tests of the cost disease hypothesis have 
concentrated on the opera, theater, and symphony orchestra, ignoring the underground 
winners of the field: rock and roll, country music, heavy metal, rave, techno, and rap. In 
fact, according to Cowen, empirical evidence from the United States on live performances 
of the classics does not support the cost disease model (Cowen, 1996, p. 211).
In an earlier paper, Baumol et al. (1985) had actually tackled some of these questions 
head-on. According to Baumol and others, the cost disease phenomenon will invade any 
and all attempts at improving productivity in labor-intensive, slow-progressive sectors of 
the economy. This is because the share of the progressive component can be expected to 
shrink over time in view of both expenditures and labor time, and what will be left, in 
the long run, will be the non-progressive component. Cowen (1996) is familiar with the 
argument, but not convinced by it. The development of recording technologies cannot be 
considered as a once-and-for-all impact on performing arts; Cowen (1996, p. 208) argues 
that recording technologies continuously improved throughout the 20th century.
Preston and Sparviero (2009; Sparviero and Preston, 2010) distinguish between the 
analytically different components of the value chain of cultural economic activities. In 
their opinion, the content component and the distribution component should be kept 
apart in empirical analysis.6 With this in mind, they went on to estimate the development 
of output, output per worker, unit labor cost, and labor compensation in “pure form ac-
tivities” and “composite content and form activities” in the U.S. economy from 1987 to 
2004 (Preston and Sparviero, 2009). In another article, they looked at the development 
of the U.S. economy from 1990 to 2003, concentrating on the growth of productivity, 
the relative sizes, and the interaction between “stagnant and asymptotically stagnant 
industries” and “progressive industries” (Sparviero and Preston, 2010).
The estimates by Preston and Sparviero go a long way toward settling the con-
troversy. On the basis of their empirical analyses, it appears that there really are both 
stagnant industries, in which improvements in productivity have been sporadic rather 
than continued, and progressive industries, which are characterized by a continuous 
stream of improvements in productivity. According to Preston and Sparviero (2009, 
p. 245), Cowen (1996) was right in pointing out that there can be marked improvements 
in productivity in the service industries. Performance output in particular, when mea-
sured in consumption units, can experience a marked increase. That is to say, there are 
progressive services. According to Sparviero’s and Preston’s (2010, p. 1911) estimates, 
these include the following: the wholesale trade, the retail trade, transportation and 
warehousing, publishing industries, broadcasting and telecommunications, securities, 
commodity contracts and investments, insurance carriers and related activities, funds, 
trusts, and other financial vehicles. In this respect, Oulton (2001), and subsequently also 
Baumol (2012, pp. 120–126), has emphasized the importance of the rapidly expanding 
business services sector.
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However, there are also stagnant and “asymptotically stagnant” (a term originally 
coined by Baumol et al., 1985) industries. According to Sparviero and Preston (2010, 
p. 1911), these industries include legal services, administrative and support services, edu-
cational services, ambulatory health-care services, hospitals and nursing and residential 
care facilities, social assistance, government, and the performing arts.
Hence, even if certain qualifications need to be taken into account for the cost 
disease hypothesis, the key conclusions of the cost disease model appear to hold true. 
This is also the conclusion by Preston and Sparviero (2009, p. 250; “The trends re-
vealed by our analysis are highly consistent with the assumptions we formulate based on 
W. J. Baumol’s theories”) and Sparviero and Preston (2010, p. 1910; “The key esti-
mates resulting from this model, (…) confirm our analysis and the continuing salience of 
Baumol’s theory”).7
Subsequently, also Nordhaus (2006; cf. Nordhaus, 2002) took another look at what 
he calls “Baumol’s diseases.” He differentiated between six distinct propositions derived 
from the cost disease model. The empirical results presented by Nordhaus gave strong 
support to the key propositions of the cost disease model, with, however, one single 
and significant exception. This was the proposition according to which industry-specific 
rewards (wages, profits) respond to the industry-specific rates of growth of productivity. 
Nordhaus found that this particular effect was very small.8
2) The second major current of scholarly discussion on the cost disease model con-
cerns the financial sustainability of social spending. Is the welfare state, which pro-
vides the bulk of core human services, financially sustainable? According to Mark Blaug 
(2001, p. 131), Baumol’s own view on this particular matter changed during the course 
of his career (see Michael Keren’s critical account of the original cost disease model; 
Keren, 1972/1997; consider Baumol’s answer to Keren, in Baumol, 1972/1997; and see 
also Baumol, 1992/1997, 1993a, 1993b, 1996, 2012, pp. xvii–xix, 181–182). Baumol’s 
(1967) original ideas were more pessimistic in tone than his subsequent assessments. 
Later on, Baumol (1992/1997) was ready to admit that “A Growing Economy Can Pay 
Its Bills.” In a recent book written in cooperation with other scholars, Baumol (2012) is 
actually quite optimistic about the future.
The topic continues to be an important part of the ongoing political economic de-
bate on the future of the welfare state. How important, exactly, is the cost disease phe-
nomenon compared with other problems that are known to cause financial difficulties 
in the public sector (globalization, moral hazard and benefit dependency, demographic 
changes in the Western political economies and in Japan, the current financial crisis in 
the United States and in the European Union)? How will the political economies actu-
ally respond to the growing real costs of the labor-intensive public services? What will 
happen to the (price and) income elasticity of the demand for human services in the 
long run?
Lindbeck (2006) provides a comprehensive review of the threats to sustainable 
social spending.9 According to Lindbeck (2006, p. 304), the years of rapid economic 
growth and structural change from the late 1940s to the mid-1970s were “highly con-
ducive” to the growth of the welfare state around the Western world. The period was 
characterized not only by robust economic growth in the West but also by a growing 
demand for welfare services by the citizenry, a favorable demographic structure with 
a relatively small number of people in elderly cohorts, low unemployment rates, and 
relatively few disincentive effects.
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Many of these factors began to change at the beginning of the 1970s with the 
slowing down of economic growth. Lindbeck (2006) discusses the following threats to 
sustainable social spending:
Globalization;a) 
Baumol’s cost disease;b) 
Demographic changes, especially in the form of the “graying” of the population;c) 
Slower productivity growth in the private sector than before;d) 
Threat of diminished employment rates; ande) 
Changes in the structure of incentives, including moral hazard and benefit dependency.f) 
Tertium quid is an obvious problem when dealing with complex political economic 
problems in which micro- and macroeffects are intertwined. We cannot easily rule out 
the possibility that there are third factors that explain the same observations as the cost 
disease hypothesis.
Lindbeck’s own estimate is straightforward enough: “I argue that threats from grad-
ually rising costs of providing human services and disincentive effects of welfare state 
arrangements, in particular moral hazard and benefit dependency, are more difficult to 
deal with than other threats” (Lindbeck, 2006, p. 303). His conclusion is that, sooner or 
later, governments will need new, complementary methods of financing the core human 
services in addition to traditional tax financing: service fees, voluntary or mandatory 
insurance, and mandatory savings accounts (Lindbeck, 2006, pp. 309, 319).
The current financial crisis in the European Union puts emphasis on measures other 
than tax financing, especially on strict financial discipline, productivity improvements 
in the public sector, and major structural reforms in public organizations. Yet, it must 
be kept in mind that what is at stake here is development in the long run and in the 
aggregate. The contemporary situation may require financial discipline rather than tax 
financing, but things can turn out to be different in the future. It is difficult, and it may 
be impossible, to know how the structure of the preferences of the citizenry will respond 
to price and income changes in the coming years.
Pressure readings
Inter-industry wage differentials
Findings on inter-industry wage differentials are consistent with the cost disease mod-
el depicted in Appendix B. The differentials are persistent and stable, both over time 
and across different countries. Gittleman and Wolff (1993) compared the differen-
tials across 14 OECD countries. They not only found that there is relatively robust 
rank order stability in inter-industry wage differentials but also found that there are 
obvious similarities in the actual wage structures across different countries.
This, in itself, is perplexing from the point of view of the standard competitive text-
book models of the demand for and supply of labor. Why are the differentials so stable 
over time and so similar across different countries? Should not rational optimizing behav-
ior wipe the differentials out, at least in the long run? Controlling for worker and job char-
acteristics—unobserved ability, job content, compensating differences, etc.—reduces the 
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scale of observed inter-industry wage differentials, but does not suffice to eliminate them 
(Gibbons and Katz, 1992; Gittleman and Pierce, 2011; Krueger and Summers, 1988).
According to Gittleman and Wolff (1993), the dogged differentials are positively 
related to an interesting series of macroeconomic quantities. These are labor productiv-
ity growth, the total factor productivity growth, GDP growth, capital intensity (capital/
labor ratio), and the degree of export orientation of the economy.
It probably should not come as a great surprise, against this background, that 
the differentials come out as expected. In empirical inter-industry wage comparisons, 
retail trade, hotels and restaurants, personal and domestic services, social welfare ser-
vices, child care, educational services, and maybe even health care (on average, but 
admittedly as a less clear-cut case) suffer from lower-than-average wages (Gibbons 
and Katz, 1992; Gittleman and Pierce, 2011; Gittleman and Wolff, 1993; Krueger 
and Summers, 1988; Reilly and Zanchi, 2003; cf., however, Nordhaus, 2006, p. 28, 
footnote 22, pp. 28–30, 38).
Time pressure
“The high productivity and consequent high cost of labor have made people increasingly 
conscious of the fact that time is money; (…) It is only natural that the pace of work 
should be speeded up.” (Scitovsky and Scitovsky, 1959, p. 101)
Productivity pressure comes in many different, and even disguised, forms for the affected 
industries, organizations, and employees. On some occasions, it might actually be dif-
ficult to recognize the beast.
Time pressure is one of the potential, straightforward consequences of productiv-
ity pressure.10 It can be expected to plague health care and personal care, in particular, 
where presence and attendance, and often very intensive care, are necessary for the qual-
ity of the end product.
In view of the development of time pressure over time, as experienced by employees 
in different sectors of the economy, Finland provides us with a graphic case. Economic 
growth in Finland was exceptionally robust from the early 1960s to the late 1980s. It 
was associated with equally strong expansion of employment in public services, par-
ticularly in health care, child care, care for the elderly, and education.11 A truly massive 
share of employment shifted from manufacturing industries and agriculture to services. 
Figure 1 depicts employment in primary, secondary, and tertiary industries in Finland 
from 1966 to 2010. The number of people employed in tertiary industries went up from 
811,000 (37.6% in 1966) to 1,762,000 (72.0% in 2010).
What happened to time pressure, as experienced by employees in different sectors of 
the economy, over this time period? If nothing whatsoever happened to time pressure,—a 
distinct manifestation of productivity pressure in health care, child care, care for the el-
derly, etc.,—then, this certainly could be considered as evidence against the cost disease 
model as depicted in this paper.
Statistics Finland produces comprehensive statistics on work and working condi-
tions in the Finnish economy. There are representative cross-section surveys with reliable 
time pressure instruments from 1977 to 2008 (Lehto and Sutela, 2008; Quality of Work 
Life Surveys, QWLS, 1977, 1984, 1990, 1997, 2003, 2008).12 One of the key advantages 
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of the surveys is that a major part of the questions in the QWLS have remained largely 
the same since the first years of the surveys.
According to Lehto and Sutela (2008), the share of respondents who suffer from 
adverse effects of time pressure (“very much” or “quite a lot”) has gone up from 18% 
(1977) to 31% (2008). In the municipalities, the share has gone up from 24% (1984) to 
38% (2008) (Lehto and Sutela, 2008, p. 68).13
In Finland, the bulk of personal care work, work in health care, and teacher’s work 
(primary and secondary education) is handled in the local government sector, and it 
is the local government sector that suffers the most from time pressure. Using eight 
indicators from the time pressure instrument of the QWLS, and the cross-section data 
from 2008, Lehto and Sutela (2008) were able to sort out the sectors of the economy 
suffering the most from time pressure. Their dichotomous criterion variable picked up 
the respondents for whom five of the eight key variables of the time pressure instrument 
were at a high level. Workers in the local government sector were found to suffer the 
most from time pressure (41%). In other sectors (private sector, central government), the 
corresponding figures were around 30%.
In a more disaggregated level of analysis, Lehto and Sutela (2008) found that em-
ployees in occupations of health care suffered the most from time pressure (52%), fol-
lowed by employees in teaching (48%) and in public sector management (48%). The 
figures were lowest in construction (21%), agriculture (18%), and manufacturing (16%) 
(Lehto and Sutela, 2008, p. 72).





































Source: Finnish Labour Review 1/2011, Tables.
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The phenomenon of time pressure, as measured in the QWLS, is clearly something 
disadvantageous from the point of view of an individual employee. It is a personal cost. 
This becomes clear when taking a glance at the way the respondents in these surveys 
conceive of the key causes and consequences of time pressure.
According to the respondents of the QWLS (2008), one of the major causes of time 
pressure is that there are simply too few employees at the workplace, compared with 
the workload. The share of employees who agree with this particular claim has gone up 
from 45% (1990) to 54% (2008). As to the consequences of time pressure, it is seen to 
cause mistakes in work. According to the respondents, it also causes burnout and poor 
team and organizational climate and increases the number of days of illness (Lehto and 
Sutela, 2008, p. 75).
The Value of time
What, then, has backed up the expansion of the supply of labor in the slow-progressive 
economic activities: the sectors with lagging wages and probably also a heightened push 
for productivity? Baumol and Bowen (1965/1997, 1966; Baumol and Throsby, 2012) 
offered one plausible reason, in vein of compensating differences: the psychic income a 
musician associates with his or her career in music. There could be other comparable 
reasons, caused by differences in individual preferences. Public service motivation is 
another candidate for the role. It has been under intense scholarly research in public 
management studies in recent years (Coursey and Pandey, 2007; Perry, 1996; Perry and 
Wise, 1990).
However, even if we allow for between-sector differences in individual preferences, 
the problem remains that, if the ratio of outputs between the progressive and non-
progressive sectors will be held constant, the non-progressive sector will have to employ 
an ever larger share of the total labor force of the economy. This means that, in the long 
run, any and all surplus of intrinsic incentives there is will be exhausted and eaten up.
There is one dynamic factor, which probably backs up the supply of labor in the 
slow-progressive sectors. It has to do with the relative value of time, which can be ex-
pected to grow with the growth of per capita income.
Time is a fixed resource in life, and very strictly so. Name almost any other entity, 
and we can produce more of it. But not time. As a consequence, the more affluent the 
society, the scarcer, relatively to all other goods, time is, and the more willingly people 
would want to buy time, if ever they could. People cannot purchase time, as such, but 
there are indirect means for accomplishing the feat.
The choice of occupation is one of the tools that people use for this purpose. The 
more affluent the society, the more willingly people substitute an interesting job, even 
with low-income and low-employment opportunities (meaningful occupation, leisurely 
time, personal consumption), for a dull job, even with high-income and high-employ-
ment opportunities (meaningless occupation, laborious time, personal investment). By 
doing this, they actually trade off relatively high-income and low-unemployment-risk 
dull jobs (laborious time, characteristic of the sometimes very difficult and demand-
ing scientific, engineering, economic, etc. occupations) for relatively low-income and 
high-unemployment-risk interesting jobs (leisurely time, characteristic of occupations in 
performing arts, humanities, philosophy, etc.).
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We certainly do not suggest that high (low)-income occupations are invariably unin-
teresting (interesting). The claim is, rather, that, instead of merely selling their labor time to 
employers, irrespective of the nature of the occupation, employees consider whether or not 
they want to spend eight hours, or a month, or some 40 years, in the occupation. Very few 
of us can actually substitute a hobby for a job (as a 100% substitution of leisure time for 
labor time), but, to a certain degree, intrinsic motives to work do constitute a factor which 
affects the choice of occupation,14 and we have a very good reason to believe that, the more 
affluent the society, the more important this factor will be, compared with other factors.
Intrinsic motives to work and the psychic income obtained thereof are not restricted 
to the liberal arts or to what is often referred to as “high culture,” or the “fine arts.” In 
the public sector, we come across intrinsic motives to work in rather mundane occupa-
tions. Helping other people, as a central example, is part of the concept of public service 
motivation (Perry, 1996; Perry and Wise, 1990), and, in view of the definition of intrinsic 
motivation (Ryan and Deci, 2000, p. 56), it is certainly an intrinsic rather than an ex-
trinsic motive to work. There are actually straightforward empirical grounds to support 
the claim. If we look at the factor structure of the work orientations inventory in the 
ISSP Work Orientations III (2005) data set, “helping other people” clearly differs from 
extrinsic incentives to work, and it turns out that it is relatively important to child-care 
workers, primary education teaching professionals, and police officers, among other 
public sector professionals (discussed in more detail below).
All the same, we admit that there are also occupations in slow-progressive services 
in which intrinsic motives play only a minor role or no role at all. Restaurant and hotel 
work, cleaning, institutional household services, repair work, and retail work may serve 
as examples. Whether or not this is actually the case,—implying the growth of the share 
of precarious rather than professionally agreeable employment—is an empirical ques-
tion. Theoretically, we certainly acquiesce to this possibility.15
Our data come from the international ISSP Work Orientations III (2005) survey, 
which contained eight questions on the personally important aspects of work. The re-
spondents were asked whether or not “high income,” “an interesting job,” and “helping 
other people,” among other considerations, were personally important to them (1 = very 
important; 5 = not important at all).
In a simple factor analysis (EFA, PAF, Promax, κ = 4, using the weights of the data 
set), the variable of high income had the largest loading to a construct which could be 
depicted as the factor of extrinsic incentives (with “opportunity to advancement” and 
“job security”), whereas the variable of helping other people had the largest loading to a 
construct which could be depicted as the factor of public service motivation (with “a job 
useful to society”). The variable of an interesting job penetrated the factor solution with 
significant side loadings to both of the above-mentioned constructs. However, because 
the reliability of the scale of extrinsic incentives was too low (by the criteria of α and 
VAR(F)), we decided to use the indicator variables with the highest loadings, and not the 
latent variables, in the analysis.
Figure 2 exhibits the relationship between GDP per capita (from Penn World Tables, 
PWT 7.0, 2011) and the ratio of the personal importance of high income to interesting 
job, across 30 different countries.16 In nine countries out of 30, the respondents valued 
high income relatively more than an interesting job (i.e., the ratio was >1.0). Eight of 
these nine countries belonged to the group of the poorest nine countries. R2 of the simple 
linear regression was 0.69.
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Figure 2: GDP per capita* and personally important aspects of work across 30 different countries 
contained in the ISSP 2005 data.a
 
*PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Laspeyres), derived from growth rates of c, g, i, at 2005 constant prices.
aNote that the original scale of the survey (1–5: 1 = very important; 5 = not important at all) was reversed in drawing 
Figure 2, to make it graphic.
Data sources: Penn World Tables, PWT 7.0, 2011, GDP per capita 2005; ISSP Work Orientations III 2005 (weighted).
Wages and time pressure tip the scale against the occupations in the slow-progressive 
sectors of the economy. Intrinsic interest in music, dance, health care, personal care, 
teaching, law enforcement, etc., has the opposite kind of effect. It is quite possible, and 
probable even, that regularities, such as the one depicted in Figure 2, are among the 
factors that enable developments such as the spectacular, massive process depicted in 
Figure 1.
The rough, aggregate empirical observations on employment, wages, time pressure, 
and the development of the intrinsic vis-à-vis extrinsic incentives, along with economic 
growth, are consistent with the predictions of the cost disease hypothesis. Next, we will 
take a comparative look at the structure of incentives in different occupations in a more 
detailed, disaggregated level of analysis.
Intrinsic motives and extrinsic incentives
With the help of the ISSP Work Orientations III (2005) survey data, consisting of 
43,440 respondents from 32 different countries, it will be possible to compare the work 
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orientations of different occupational groups to one another in a very detailed man-
ner. Our primary interest here is in health care and personal care (particularly nursing 
and midwifery professionals, child-care workers, institution-based personal care work-
ers, and home-based personal care workers), teaching (particularly primary education 
teaching professionals and secondary education teaching professionals, but also college, 
university, and higher education teaching professionals), performing arts (particularly 
musicians and singers, choreographers and dancers,17 and film, stage, and related actors 
and directors), and law enforcement (particularly police officers). These occupational 
groups most obviously represent employees in labor-intensive services, with little or no 
opportunity for labor-augmenting technological improvements.
In view of intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives, we expect that, for the 
above-mentioned occupational groups:
h1-1:  high income would be personally less important than for all occupations, on average;
h1-2:  an interesting job would be personally more important than for all occupations, on 
average;
h1-3:  helping other people would be personally more important than for all occupations, on 
average, particularly in health care, personal care, teaching, and law enforcement.
We computed country-specific z-scores for three distinct variables of personally impor-
tant aspects of work, using the ISSP Work Orientations III (2005) data set: “high in-
come,” “an interesting job,” and “help other people.” That is to say, the distributions 
were (0,1)-standardized for each country, the resulting z-scores reflecting standardized 
country-specific means and country-specific deviations from the mean. With such a se-
ries of z-scores, we compared the scores of the different occupational groups to the norm 
score (zero) across all occupations in all countries.
The results of the exercise are reported in Appendix A, Tables A1–A3, for 18 differ-
ent occupational groups (ISCO 1988, 4-digit classification). In Table 1, which compiles 
the results, we take a look at the means from the particular point of view of our hypoth-
eses (h1-1, h1-2, and h1-3). The table tells us that 17 out of 30 means were in the ex-
pected direction, with a statistically significant difference from the norm score (*); 10/30 
means were in the expected direction, with no statistically significant difference from the 
norm score (+); and 3/30 means were in the unexpected direction, with no statistically 
significant difference from the norm score (–).18
Almost all of the means of the different occupational groups were observed to be in 
the right direction (i.e., as expected) when comparing the occupational group scores to 
the norm scores (zero). There were three exceptions to this.
One of the exceptions was formed by the group of police officers. They do value an 
interesting job, and it is personally important for police officers to be able to help other 
people, but it appears that they also value high income, perhaps even more so than other 
people in general. Another exception was formed by home-based personal care workers. 
It appears that an interesting job is not more important to home-based personal care 
workers than to people in other occupations in general, perhaps even less so. They do 
think, however, more than others on average, that it is important to be able to help other 
people. The third exception was perhaps the easiest to understand. It appears that, to be 
able to help other people, is not a personally important aspect of work for “film, stage 
and related actors and directors”, not at least to any extraordinary degree.
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Conclusions
In this article, we put forward a simple formal model, which reconstructed, in a slightly 
renewed form, the model of unbalanced growth, originally devised by William Baumol 
(1967). The model demonstrated that there is an analytically feasible and empirically 
plausible domain of parameters in which the tax rate of the economy reaches its all-time 
high; in which employees in the slow-progressive sector suffer from lower-than-average 
wages; and in which the organizations and employees in the slow-progressive sector 
are forced to struggle with persistent productivity pressure. If the political mechanism 
of the economy fails to keep up with required measures of reallocation, the cost disease 
phenomenon will give rise to downward pressure on the rate of growth of unit wages 
and upward pressure on the rate of growth of productivity in the slow-progressive sec-
tors of the economy.
Table 1 Personally important aspects of work by occupational groups: classification of the results.a
High income, expected 
to be less important 
than on average
An interesting job, 
expected to be more 
important than on 
average
Help other people, 
expected to be more 
important than on 
average
Nursing and midwifery  
professionals
+ * *
Child-care workers * + *
Institution-based personal care 
workers 
+ + *
Home-based personal care 
workers
+ – *
Primary education teaching 
professionals
+ * *
Secondary education teaching 
professionals
* * *
College, university, and higher 
education teaching professionals
* * +
Composers, musicians, and 
singers 
+ * +
Film, stage, and related actors 
and directors
+ * –
Police officers – * *
+Mean in the expected direction, with no statistically significant difference from the norm score.
*Mean in the expected direction, with statistically significant difference from the norm score.
–Mean in the unexpected direction, with no statistically significant difference from the norm score.
aFor a closer account of the results, see Appendix A.
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The paper was theoretical in nature, but we also took a brief look at a few inter-
esting empirical observations. We are the first to admit that the findings are but early, 
rough, empirical intimations. However, they did give preliminary support to the proposi-
tions of the paper, or at least they did not belie the propositions.
The observed changes in employment, wages, experienced time pressure, and the 
relative value of time, with the growth of per capita income, all correspond to what 
we would expect on the basis of the cost disease hypothesis. The same applies to the 
observed differences in the structure of incentives across different occupational groups. 
Intrinsic and extrinsic incentives, as measured in the ISSP Work Orientations III (2005) 
data set, were almost unexceptionally consistent with the big picture.
Part of the innovativeness of the current paper resides in the fact that these particu-
lar aspects of the cost disease hypothesis—the effects on unit wages, productivity pres-
sure, and the structure of incentives in slow-progressive economic activities—have been 
largely unexplored in earlier empirical research. Earlier research has focused on other 
kinds of implications of the cost disease phenomenon: the contraction of the overall rate 
of growth of the economy in the long run, problems concerning the overall tax rate of 
the economy, and the associated problems of sustainable social spending.
While the highly aggregate approaches characteristic of earlier research are per-
fectly acceptable as such, we argue that something is missing from the picture. There 
is a structural aspect to the political economy and political economic actors. Economic 
growth, structural change, specialization, and deepening heterogeneity of work, labor, 
and human capital all go hand in hand.
When an economy grows, it experiences structural change. At the same time, it be-
comes ever more subtly specialized and structured.19 The labor factor of production be-
comes differentiated and the different kinds of labor provide poor substitutes for each 
other in production. In addition to “homogeneous labor,” “homogeneous units of worker 
productivity,” “skilled” vis-à-vis “unskilled” labor, and “homogeneous human capital,” 
modern labor economics and human resource management studies need to be able to 
conceive of the different conditions and contexts of work: the “heterogeneity of labor,” 
“heterogeneous human capital,” and the occupation-specific drivers of motivation.
In this paper, we also briefly reflected upon some of the most common objections 
to the cost disease hypothesis. The effects of technological innovations on the structure 
of the economy are unforeseeable, and it has been suggested that there are services in-
dustries that have been capable of actually escaping the cost disease trap. On the basis 
of Preston’s and Sparviero’s analyses, we can say that there are indeed exceptions to 
the cost disease rule in the sense that there are progressive services. The picture is much 
more complicated than it was thought to be on the basis of the original cost disease 
model. Yet, at the same time, it appears that practically all observations concerning core 
human services (health care, child care, care for the elderly, teaching, and law enforce-
ment) still continue to correspond to the predictions of the cost disease model.
We also pointed out that the difficulties associated with the financial sustainability 
of social spending may become aggravated as the real costs of human services keep on 
rising. Universalism is one of the core differentiating characteristics of the Nordic wel-
fare state regime (or the “Scandinavian welfare state regime,” cf. Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
pp. 27–29). In such a system, high-quality public services are provided to all. The system 
is financially burdensome, because it is based on services provided to all citizens, not, 
essentially, on income transfer payments or mere generalized sharing of risks. All citizens 
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benefit from services and all will also, “presumably (…),” as noted by Esping-Andersen 
(1990, p. 28) “(…) feel obliged to pay.”
The political mechanism is the decisive element here, and political decisions are cer-
tainly based on many things other than the rising costs of human services. There are sev-
eral exogenous factors affecting these decisions, globalization, for example, which has a 
powerful effect on the overall economic growth and structure of the political economy. 
There are also other constraints affecting the financial sustainability of social spending, 
such as the problems of moral hazard and benefit dependency. Finally, there is the public 
demand for human services, which will also probably experience changes in the long run 
depending on the income (and price) elasticity of the demand for these services.
One of the most important endogenous factors is surely the quality of public ser-
vices. If the quality of public services gets worse, the willingness of the citizens to pay for 
these services will be diminished. Erosion of the demand for, and funding of, the public 
services can be expected to lead to further deterioration of the quality of these services. 
But, obviously, also another kind of corner solution—high-quality public services with 
citizens strongly committed to their funding—is possible.
Appendix A
Tables A1–A3
In Tables A1–A3, we report country-specific z-scores for three distinct variables of per-
sonally important aspects of work. We have used the ISSP Work Orientations III (2005) 
data set in the analysis. The respondents assessed the personal importance of “high in-
come” (hi), “an interesting job” (ij), and “help other people” (hop). The original scale 
(1–5) ranged from 1 = very important to 5 = not important at all. We used the weights 
of the data set throughout the analysis.
The original scores of the survey data were (0, 1) standardized for each country. 
Hence, the z-scores in the tables reflect country-specific standardized means and country-
specific standardized deviations from the mean. We use these country-specific z-scores 
when comparing the scores of the different occupational groups to the norm score (zero) 
across all occupations in all countries.
The procedure is simple and straightforward. It may actually be a bit too simple; it 
might be a good idea to rerun the analyses with the help of, for example, multilevel models 
or nonparametric methods. However, there are other obstacles to the multivariate models, 
particularly the insufficient number of observations among certain occupational groups.
Nonetheless, the procedure as it stands does provide us with information about 
the opinions of the respondents in certain occupations (e.g., police officers) on, say, the 
personal importance of “high income,” on average, compared with the country means 
(norm scores, zeros) for that particular variable; in other words, they show us whether 
their opinions were on the negative side (i.e., more important), on average, compared 
with the country means or on the positive side (less important), on average, compared 
with the country means.
We report the means ( )x , standard deviations (SD), standard errors (SE), and con-
fidence intervals (CI) for the different occupations in the three tables. The occupation 
codes correspond to the ISCO (1988) 4-digit classification.
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Table A1  Means of country-specific z-scores by occupational groups: “personally important: high 
income”.






95% CI  
Lower
95% CI  
Upper
Medical doctors 2221 136 –0.007 0.918 0.079 –0.163 0.148
Dentists 2222 33 –0.105 0.864 0.150 –0.410 0.200
Veterinarians 2223 20 –0.150 0.912 0.202 –0.571 0.272
Pharmacists 2224 28   0.001 1.127 0.211 –0.432 0.435
Nursing and midwifery 
professionals
2230 276   0.086 0.951 0.057 –0.027 0.198
Child-care workers 5131 241    0.141* 1.058 0.068   0.007 0.275
Institution-based  
personal care workers 
5132 272   0.058 1.047 0.063 –0.067 0.183
Home-based personal 
care workers
5133 84   0.228 1.231 0.134 –0.039 0.495
Primary education  
teaching professionals
2331 314   0.078 0.869 0.049 –0.018 0.175
Secondary education 
teaching professionals
2320 459    0.169* 1.034 0.048   0.074 0.264
College, university, and 
higher education  
teaching professionals
2310 167    0.181* 1.065 0.082   0.018 0.344
Authors, journalists,  
and other writers 
2451 95    0.338* 1.078 0.110   0.119 0.558
Sculptors, painters,  
and related artists 
2452 33    0.409* 1.019 0.177   0.047 0.770
Composers, musicians,  
and singers
2453 15   0.127 1.100 0.287 –0.490 0.744
Choreographers and 
dancers
2454 n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
Film, stage, and related 
actors and directors
2455 26   0.048 0.958 0.188 –0.340 0.436
Police inspectors  
and detectives
3450 33 –0.162 0.813 0.142 –0.451 0.127
Police officers 5162 152 –0.057 0.892 0.072 –0.200 0.086
All occupations Total 33,542 –0.008 0.995 0.005 –0.019 0.003
aISCO 1988, 4 digit.
n.r. = not reported, less than ten observations.
Original scale (1–5): 1 = very important, …, 5 = not important at all.
Data source: ISSP Work Orientations III 2005 (weighted).
x (c.s.-z; hi) ∼ mean, based on country-specific z-scores, “high income.”
*p < .05.
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Table A2  Means of country-specific z-scores by occupational groups: “personally important: an 
interesting job”.






95% CI  
Lower
95% CI  
Upper
Medical doctors 2221 136 –0.345* 0.728 0.062 –0.469 –0.222
Dentists 2222 32 –0.190 1.254 0.221 –0.640   0.260
Veterinarians 2223 20 –0.074 1.067 0.236 –0.567   0.419
Pharmacists 2224 27 –0.075 0.986 0.188 –0.462   0.312
Nursing and midwifery 
professionals
2230 278 –0.113* 0.918 0.055 –0.221 –0.004
Child-care workers 5131 239 –0.096 0.925 0.060 –0.214   0.022
Institution-based  
personal care workers 
5132 273 –0.044 0.951 0.058 –0.157   0.070
Home-based personal  
care workers
5133 84 0.107 1.119 0.122 –0.135   0.350
Primary education  
teaching professionals
2331 316 –0.238* 0.831 0.047 –0.330 –0.146
Secondary education  
teaching professionals
2320 458 –0.227* 0.829 0.039 –0.304 –0.151
College, university, and 
higher education teaching 
professionals
2310 167 –0.410* 0.764 0.059 –0.526 –0.293
Authors, journalists, and 
other writers 
2451 97 –0.146 1.169 0.119 –0.382   0.089
Sculptors, painters, and 
related artists 
2452 33 –0.145 1.052 0.183 –0.519   0.228
Composers, musicians,  
and singers
2453 15 –0.465* 0.670 0.175 –0.841 –0.089
Choreographers and 
dancers
2454 n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
Film, stage, and related  
actors and directors
2455 26 –0.409* 0.758 0.149 –0.716 –0.102
Police inspectors and 
detectives
3450 33 –0.156 0.808 0.141 –0.443   0.131
Police officers 5162 149 –0.200* 0.874 0.071 –0.341 –0.059
All occupations Total 33,544 –0.009 0.987 0.005 –0.020   0.001
aISCO 1988, 4 digit.
n.r. = not reported, less than ten observations.
Original scale (1–5): 1 = very important, …, 5 = not important at all.
Data source: ISSP Work Orientations III 2005 (weighted).
x (c.s.-z; ij) ∼ mean, based on country-specific z-scores, “interesting job.”
*p < .05.
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Table A3  Means of country-specific z-scores by occupational groups: “personally important: help 
other people”.






95% CI  
Lower
95% CI  
Upper
Medical doctors 2221 137 –0.441* 0.851 0.073 –0.585 –0.297
Dentists 2222 33 –0.723* 0.668 0.116 –0.959 –0.487
Veterinarians 2223 20 0.061 1.051 0.232 –0.425   0.546
Pharmacists 2224 28 –0.202 0.957 0.179 –0.570   0.166
Nursing and midwifery 
professionals
2230 277 –0.445* 0.765 0.046 –0.535 –0.354
Child-care workers 5131 240 –0.294* 0.869 0.056 –0.405 –0.184
Institution-based personal 
care workers 
5132 274 –0.551* 0.863 0.052 –0.654 –0.448
Home-based personal 
care workers
5133 84 –0.332* 0.972 0.106 –0.542 –0.121
Primary education  
teaching professionals
2331 316 –0.287* 0.852 0.048 –0.381 –0.193
Secondary education 
teaching professionals
2320 453 –0.260* 0.837 0.039 –0.338 –0.183
College, university,  
and higher education  
teaching professionals
2310 167 –0.103 0.947 0.073 –0.248   0.042
Authors, journalists, and 
other writers 
2451 94 0.061 0.983 0.101 –0.140   0.262
Sculptors, painters, and 
related artists 
2452 33 0.250 0.935 0.163 –0.082   0.581
Composers, musicians, 
and singers
2453 15 –0.194 0.605 0.158 –0.533   0.145
Choreographers and 
dancers
2454 n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
Film, stage, and related 
actors and directors
2455 26 0.097 0.966 0.190 –0.294   0.488
Police inspectors  
and detectives
3450 33 –0.426* 0.732 0.128 –0.686 –0.166
Police officers 5162 149 –0.217* 0.907 0.074 –0.363 –0.070
All occupations Total 33,385 –0.008 0.993 0.005 –0.019   0.003
aISCO 1988, 4 digit.
n.r. = not reported, less than ten observations.
Original scale (1–5): 1 = very important, …, 5 = not important at all.
Data source: ISSP Work Orientations III 2005 (weighted).
x (c.s.-z; hop) ∼ mean, based on country-specific z-scores, “help other people.”
*p < .05.
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Appendix B
Tax rate and differential wage rates in a model of unbalanced growth
Tax rate
Assar Lindbeck’s (2006) model of unbalanced growth includes tax rate (τ) for the fund-
ing of public services. Otherwise, it largely corresponds to Baumol’s (1967) classic for-
mulation for the model.
In Lindbeck’s (2006) model, the slow-progressive sector of the economy produces 
human services in the public sector (Q1t), whereas the fast-progressive sector produces 
goods in the private sector (Q2t). Homogeneous labor employed in the two distinct 
sectors (L1t, L2t) constitutes the only factor of production in the economy. The rate of 
growth of productivity is higher in the fast-progressive sector (r) compared with the 
slow-progressive sector (ρ), r > ρ. The rate of growth of wages (Wt) is the same across 
the two sectors. It is given by the rate of growth of productivity in the fast-progressive 
sector, r. The development of output and wages over time (t) is given by equations (1), 
(2), and (3).
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Unit costs are given by equations (4) and (5), and total costs by equations (6) and (7), 
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Lindbeck (2006) assumes a balanced budget for the slow-progressive sector. Tax rate (τ) 
equals the ratio of public to total costs of the economy. Equation (8) gives the tax rate.
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Equation (8) can be expressed in terms of the output variables Qit. Rewriting equation 











































We will now assume that while workers in different sectors of the economy originally 
enjoy equal wages W0, the rate of growth of wages will be different in the two sectors. 
In the fast-progressive sector, it continues to follow the lead of the rate of growth of 
productivity (r), but in the slow-progressive sector, the rate of growth of wages (φ) falls 
between r and ρ, r > φ > ρ.
The assumption corresponds to the original intimation by Baumol and Bowen 
(1966) as probably the most realistic assumption as regards the development of wages 
in the slow-progressive sector. Here, we merely formalize their idea.
The idea can be readily expressed in terms of the differential rates depicted above. 
Having considered two other alternatives, first the one in which r > φ = ρ = 0 and second 
the one in which r = φ > ρ = 0, Baumol and Bowen (1966) went on to write, “There is 
a third alternative, which, in fact, comes closest to what we find in practice. Wages of 
performers do rise, but they do not always manage to keep up with wages in the rest of 
the economy. (…) Even in the long run, earnings in the performing arts may lag behind 
wages in occupations which provide less in the way of psychic income” (Baumol and 
Bowen, 1966, p. 169).
So, while equations (1) and (2) stay as they are, we will rewrite equation (3) as equa-
tions (3’.a) and (3’.b).
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The unit cost and total cost equations will be slightly different from Lindbeck’s (2006) 
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Note that if the rate of growth of wages in the slow-progressive sector of the economy 
actually ranges between φ and r, within the range of those particular periods that φ 
reaches r (φ = r), the Lindbeck (2006) model and our own model come together again. 
Equation (8’) reduces to equation (8). The same applies to equation (9’) in relation to 
equation (9).
The model demonstrates that there is an analytically feasible and empirically plau-
sible domain of parameters in which the tax rate of the economy (τ) reaches its all-time 
high, while, at the same time, employees in the slow-progressive sector suffer from low-
er-than-average wages, (r − φ) > 0, and while, still in the same domain of parameters, the 
organizations and employees in the sector have to deal with persistent and often stern 
productivity pressure, (φ − ρ) > 0. 
Data
Finnish Labour Review (2011) No. 1/2011, Tables. Available at http://www.tem.fi/files/29377/
tak12011.pdf (Accessed November 16, 2011).
ISCO (1988) International Standard Classification of Occupations, 1988. http://www.ilo.org/
public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/major.htm (Accessed February 18, 2013).
ISSP Work Orientations III (2005) FSD2287: International Social Survey Programme: Work 
Orientations III, 2005 [electronic data]. Version 1.0 (2007-09-12). Madrid: Anàlisis 
Sociòlógicos, Económicos y Politicos, S. A. (JDS/ASEP); Köln: Zentralarchiv für Em-
pirische Sozialforschung [producers, delivery], 2007. Tampere: Yhteiskuntatieteellinen 
tietoarkisto [delivery], 2007.
PWT 7.0 Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 7.0, 
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, June (2011) XLS. Available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ (Accessed 
November 16, 2011).
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End notes
1 Theater, opera, music, and dance.
2  For an interesting explanation of the skewed distribution of earnings in challenging occupations, see 
Roy (1950, 1951).
3  Perhaps a primary example of an industry-specific intervening factor is the high price inelasticity (and 
also high income elasticity) of health care and medication, making massive reallocation, profits, and 
profit sharing possible in the field.
4  For example, Peacock (1996, p. 218), Curtis and Murthy (1998, p. 780), van Reenen (1999, 
p. 148), Lindbeck (2006, p. 319), Nordhaus (2006, pp. 36–38), Preston and Sparviero (2009, p. 251), 
Sparviero and Preston (2010, p. 1910 and passim), and Fernandez and Palazuelos (2012, p. 246).
5  For example, Robinson (1969), Bradford (1969/1997), Keren (1972/1997), Cowen (1996), Ferris and 
West (1996), Oulton (2001), Nordhaus (2002), and Triplett and Bosworth (2003).
6  Or, in a more refined analysis, a) the production of content, b) the packaging, marketing, and distrib-
uting of media content, and c) the delivery and exhibition of content (Preston and Sparviero, 2009, 
pp. 245–246).
7  What we actually see happening here is that Baumol’s (1967) originally abstract macroeconomic 
model is interpreted more precisely and receives niche support from concrete, disaggregated analyses. 
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This could have actually been anticipated on the basis of Peacock’s (1996) scholarly scrutiny of the 
methodological genre of Baumol’s work. Peacock referred to the “Malthusian” nature of Baumol’s 
economics. According to him, Baumol has been attracted to “courageously simplified” models and to 
the “broad sweep” of classical dynamics. Such models either thrive or die as the scholarly community 
proceeds to more detailed empirical analyses.
8  The results from the analyses of inter-industry wage differentials, which are briefly reviewed in this 
paper, appear to contradict the conclusions offered by Nordhaus (2006). This may, however, have to 
do with the differences in the levels, vis-à-vis the rates of growth, of wages. The former kinds of differ-
ences have been accumulating for a long time; the major differences in the levels of wages may have 
been brought about by minor differences in the rates of growth of wages.
9  Van der Ploeg (2006) offers a detailed, but less accessible, theoretical analysis of sustainable social 
spending.
10  There are several other kinds of manifestations to refer to. Product variety may be reduced. In the-
ater and musicals, cast sizes have been observed to be secularly contracting (Baumol and Baumol, 
1985/1997, pp. 220–222). Prices may shoot up with distinct, selective effects on consumption. Com-
mon handicrafts of earlier days are modern luxury products; craftsmanship bears the mark of distin-
guished rarity nowadays. Productive activities in an industry or in an occupation may come to an end. 
This is what has happened in private personal services; butler, manservant, and maid are unknown 
entries to modern classifications of occupations (Bill Bryson provides us with a charming historical 
account of private personal services; see Bryson, 2010, pp. 134–166). Compromising over the quality 
of the end product is yet another way of dealing with productivity pressure, especially in economic 
activities in which consumers are not in a position to directly punish low-quality producers (monopo-
lies, oligopolies, public services). Also, slowly but surely, productivity has become an issue and a real 
intellectual puzzle in public management, much in line with the doctrine of New Public Management 
and the early ideas of the National Audit Office and the Audit Commission, but not restricted to the 
Anglo-Saxon countries (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1990; Pollitt and Summa, 1999).
11  Finland was and still is closely attached to the so-called “Scandinavian welfare state regime” (on the 
concept, see Esping-Andersen, 1990).
12  For the English version, see http://www.stat.fi/tup/julkaisut/tiedostot/working_conditions.pdf
13  Lehto and Sutela (2008) further note that findings from the European Working Conditions Survey 
point to the same direction. The share of respondents who had to “work to tight deadlines at least ¼ 
of the time” went up from 49% (1990, EU10) to 62% (2005, EU25).
14  There is nothing new to the first part of the argument. Kenneth W. Thomas (2002, p. 118, and passim), 
for example, has explicitly noted that, while more pay is certainly better than less (other things being 
equal), it is perfectly possible for the differences in pay to be outweighed by the intrinsic rewards that 
the lower paying jobs may have to offer. The idea of compensating differences was introduced to the 
classical political economy by Adam Smith.
15  We thank the anonymous referee of our article for pointing out the argument of this paragraph.
16  The relationship between (1) GDP per capita and personal importance of high income is closer than 
that between (2) GDP per capita and personal importance of an interesting job. Yet, R2 of the model 
grows a bit when the focus shifts from the high-income approach (i.e., model 1) to the ratio approach 
(i.e., to the model in Figure 2).
17  Unfortunately, there were not enough choreographers and dancers in the data set.
18  The difference from the norm score (zero) was not statistically significant in any of these three cases.
19  “Two features of the advanced economy have important cultural and social implications. (…),” ac-
cording to Scitovsky and Scitovsky (1959, p. 96), “(…) One is high cost of labor, the other large scale 
organization and extreme specialization.”
